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MONETARIST FISCAL THEORY: THREE EQUILIBRATING VARIABLES
By Hans Brems
Abstract
According to Milton Friedman, monetary policy cannot peg
the rate of unemployment for more than very limited periods.
A Friedman model, then, must dismiss and go beyond such limited
periods and become a long-run model having, instead of the rate
of unemployment, three other equilibrating variables, i.e., the
rate of inflation and the nominal and real rates of interest.
Friedman himself has been reluctant to specify such a mo-
del, but the paper specifies a neoclassical growth model whose
solutions are capable of delivering his conclusions, i.e.,
first, that money does not matter for any real variable; se-
cond, that money does matter for all nominal variables; and,
third, that the rate of growth of the money supply may be
thought of as a policy instrument used to control inflation.
Within such a neoclassical-growth framework the paper exam-
ines fiscal policy and crowding-out via the real rate of inter-
est.

MONETARIST FISCAL THEORY: THREE EQUILIBRATING VARIABLES
By Hans Brems
To state the general conclusion . .
.
, the monetary
authority controls nominal quantities .... It cannot
use its control over nominal quantities to peg a
real quantity.
Milton Friedman (1968: 11)
Monetarists wish to include the rate of inflation among their
equilibrating variables. To do so they must unfreeze price. But it
wouldn't do merely to move price P from the list of parameters to the
list of variables. A static system can determine nothing but the levels
of its variables, and it is one thing to tell how high price would be.
It is quite a different thing to tell how rapidly price is changing
—
which is what inflation is all about. Any model defining inflation
will contain a derivative with respect to time dP/dt, hence be intrin-
sically dynamic. Any model admitting inflation as an equilibrating
variable will immediately have two additional ones, i.e., the nominal
and the real rate of interest.
Keynes, who paid less attention to price as a variable, did not
appreciate Fisher's (1896) distinction between a nominal and a real rate
of interest. Keynes (1936: 222-229) did consider "own rates" of
interest like a wheat rate of interest, a copper rate of interest, and
so on, and discussed their carrying-cost and liquidty aspects. On pp.
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142-143 he discussed Fisher's aspect of such own rates but remained un-
convinced. The distinction between a nominal and a real rate of interest
is the strength of monetarists from Turgot (1769-1770) to Mundell (1971).
The weakness of monetarists is the scant attention they pay to physical
output.
Monetarists wish to exclude the rate of unemployment from their
equilibrating variables: "Monetary policy," says Friedman (1968: 5),
"cannot peg the rate of unemployment for more than very limited periods."
A Friedman model, then, must dismiss and go beyond such limited periods
and become a long-run model. Friedman himself has been reluctant to
specify such a model, but a neoclassical growth model will require little
modification to deliver his conclusions. Let us see how.
I. A MONETARIST MODEL WITH THREE EQUILIBRATING VARIABLES
1. Variables
C = physical consumption
D = desired holding of money
G = physical government purchase of goods and services
g = proportionate rate of growth of variable v
I = physical investment
L = labor employed
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P = price of goods and services
R = tax revenue
r = nominal rate of interest
p = real rate of interest
S = physical capital stock
W = money wage bill
w = money wage rate
X i physical output
Y = money national income
y = money disposable income
Z = money profit bill
2. Parameters
a = multiplicative factor of production function
a, 8 = exponents of production function
c = propensity to consume
F H available labor force
g = proportionate rate of growth of parameter v
X = proportion employed of available labor force
M = supply of money
m = multiplicative factor of demand-for-money function
u = exponent of demand-for-money function
T 3 tax rate
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The model will include derivatives with respect to time, hence is
dynamic. All parameters are stationary except a, F, and M whose growth
rates are stationary.
3. The Model
Define the proportionate rate of growth of variable v as
(1). g
v
-="
dv 1
dt v
Define investment as the derivative of capital stock with respect
to time;
dS
(2) I = —
dt
Define the real rate of interest as the nominal one minus the rate
of inflation:
(3) p = r - gp
Let profit maximization under pure competition equalize, first,
real wage rate and physical marginal productivity of labor:
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w 3X
(4) - ,
P 3L
and, second, the cost of capital and the physical marginal productivity
of capital stock. In an inflationary economy, the cost of capital to a
firm investing in physical goods is the real rate of interest, hence
3X
(5) P = —
as
The partial derivatives contained in (4) and (5) cannot be taken,
and the system cannot be solved, until the production function thus
differentiated has been specified. Monetarists have shown no interest
in such specification but may not object, we hope, to a Cobb-Douglas
form
(6) X = aL
a
S
B
where 0<a<l;0<B<l;a+B=l; and a > 0. Now we may take our
partial derivatives
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3X X
(7) — = a -
3L L
(8)
3X X
3S S
Insert (8) into (5), rearrange, and find desired capital stock
(9) S = gX/p
Insert (7) into (4), rearrange, and find the price equation
wL
(10) P = —
ctX
saying that neoclassical price P equals per-unit labor cost wL/X marked
up in the proportion 1/a.
Once priced, physical output becomes national income: Let capital
stock be immortal, so we may ignore capital consumption allowances and
define national income as the money value of physical output
(11) Y £ PX
-7-
Define money disposable income before capital gains as national
income minus government net receipts:
(12) y = Y - R
Let real wealth in the neoclassical model consist of real money
stock M/P and the physical capital stock S. Real capital gains on real
money stock are -g M/P and on physical capital stock zero. Consequently
real disposable income after capital gains is (Y - R - g M)/P, and let
consumption be the fraction c of that:
(13) C = c(Y - R - gpM)/P
Let labor employed be the proportion X of available labor force:
(14) L = AF
where < A < 1. The difference 1 - A is the "natural" rate of unemploy-
ment, on which Friedman (1968: 8) says:
A lower level of unemployment is an indication that there is
an excess demand for labor that will produce upward pressure
on real wage rates. A higher level of unemployment is an
indication that there is an excess supply of labor that will
produce a downward pressure on real wage rates.
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Friedman (1968: 5) concludes that "monetary policy . .. cannot peg
the rate of unemployment for more than very limited periods." In other
words, our long-run representation of a Friedman system may consider
\ a parameter.
Let tax revenue be in proportion to money national income:
(15) R = TY
and let the government finance its deficit, if any, by issuing noninterest-
bearing claims upon itself called money. The government budget constraint
is then
dM
(16) GP - R = —
dt
1
Let the demand for money be a function of money national income
and the nominal rate of interest:
(17) D = mYrM
where u < and m > 0.
Goods-market equilibrium requires the supply of goods to equal the
demand for them:
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(18) X = C + I + G
Money-market equilibrium requires the supply of money to equal the
demand for it:
(19) M = D
We may now proceed to solving the system for the growth rates of
its variables and for the level of its real interest rate.
II. STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIUM-GROWTH SOLUTIONS
1. Growth-Rate Solutions
By differentiating equations (1) through (19) with respect to time
the reader may convince himself that they are satisfied by the following
steady-state growth solutions
(20) g
c
= gx
(21)
*D " hi
-10-
(22) gG
=
(23) g T =I °X
(24) gT =L 6F
(25) hi
= 8Y
(26) gR
= gY
(27) g
r
=
(28) g
p
=
(29) gg
= gx
(30) hj = 8Y
<31 > 8w/P
= 8
a
/a
(32) h = 8a/a + gF
(33) gy = gp + gx
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(34) g
y
= gy
(35) g
z
= gy
2. Properties of Growth-Rate Solutions
Our growth-rate solutions neatly deliver Friedman's conclusions.
First, money does not matter for any real varible. No growth-rate
solution for the eight real variables C, G, I, L, S, p, w/P, and X has
g^ in it, directly or indirectly.
Second, money does matter for all nominal variables: The growth
rates of the eight nominal variables D, P, R, r, W, Y, y and Z all de-
pend, directly or indirectly, upon the rate of growth g of the money
supply.
Third, the rate of growth g of the money supply may be thought of
as a policy instrument and used to control inflation: Take the growth-
rate solutions (25) and (33) together insert (32) and find
(36) gp
= gM
- (g
a
/a + gp )
or, in English: Knowing the rate of technological progress g and the
rate of growth of the labor force g,, and knowing the elasticity a of
r
output with respect to labor, the monetary authorities may control the
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rate of inflation gp by controlling the rate of growth g^ of the money
supply. For example, if g = 0.016, a = 4/5, and g„ = 0.01, then alter-
a r
native rates of growth of the money supply g will produce the following
rates of inflation gp :
gM 8P
0.03
0.05 0.02
0.07 0.04
0.09 0.06
3. The Steady-State Equilibrium Real Rate of Interest
So far, so good: Our growth-rate solutions neatly delivered
Friedman's conclusions. Will level solutions do the same? The clue is
the real rate of interest p. In accordance with the definition (2),
differentiate desired capital stock (9), use (1), and write desired in-
vestment
(37) I = Bg^/p
Insert the definition (11) of national income and the tax function
(15) into the consumption function (13) and the government budget con-
straint (16) and write physical consumption and government purchase
-13-
(38) C = c[(l - T)X - gpM/P]
(39) G = TX + g^/P
Finally insert (37), (38), "and (39) into the goods-market equili-
brium condition (18), rearrange, divide numerator and denominator alike
by physical output X, insert the definition (11) of national income,
and solutions (25) and (33), and write the real rate of interest
6gy
(40) p =
(1 - c)(l - T) - [(1 - c)g
p
+ gx
]M/Y
As long as the solution (25) holds, the money supply and money
national income are growing at the same rate, hence the ratio M/Y is
stationary, and so is the real rate of interest (40). Will the level
at which the real rate of interest (40) remains stationary be affected
by fiscal and monetary policy?
4. Fiscal Policy
Let an increased government purchase G be tax-financed: In the
government budget constraint (16) the tax rate T is up whereas the rate
of growth g of the money supply is unaffected. If because of the
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frozen "natural" rate of unemployment physical output has no give in it,
room for increased government purchase must be found by reducing either
consumption or investment or both. In the case of tax financing both
will be reduced; In the consumption function (13) a higher tax rate T
means less consumption. In the solution (40) for the level of the real
rate of interest a higher T means a lower denominator, hence a higher
real rate of interest p. In the investment function (37) a higher p
means less investment.
In conclusion, fiscal policy does affect the level of the real
rate of interest. Monetarists find this effect perfectly natural,
indeed necessary: The effect is part of the crowding-out mechanism.
5. Monetary Policy
Let an increased government purchase G be money-financed: In the
government budget constraint (16) the tax rate T is unaffected whereas
the rate of growth g^ of the money supply is up. If because of the
frozen "natural" rate of unemployment physical output has no give in it,
room for increased government purchase must be found by reducing either
consumption or investment or both. In the case of money financing both
will be reduced: According to the solution (32) the rate of growth g
of physical output has no give in it. According to the solution (33),
then, a higher rate of growth g^ of the money supply must mean a higher
rate of growth g , hence in the consumption function (13) heavier
capital loss and less consumption. In the solution (40) for the level
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of the real rate of interest a higher g means a lower denominator,
hence a higher real rate of interest p. In the investment function
(37) a higher p means less investment.
In conclusion, monetary policy, too, affects the level of the real
rate of interest, and that effect, too, is part of the crowding-out
mechanism. But such an effect is in ill accordance with Friedman's
view that "the monetary authority cannot use its control over nominal
quantities to peg a real quantity." The real rate of interest is_ real!
However this may be, given the form (17) of our demand- for-money
function, none of our conclusions depended upon any particular value of
the elasticity u of the demand for money with respect to the nominal
rate of interest—and Friedman (1966) now agrees. No need for a vertical
LM curve!
6. What Remains?
So far, we have accepted Friedman's "natural" rate of unemployment
and found his conclusions to follow, at least as far as growth rates—if
not levels—are concerned. More will be said on the "natural" rate in
ch. 8.
Leaving out government bonds, we have formulated a very simple
government budget constraint. But a government deficit may be financed
either by expanding the money supply or the bond supply.
Bent Hansen (1955: ch. Ill) was perhaps the first to write an
explicit government budget constraint in a macroeconomic model, and Ott
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and Ott (1965) and Christ (1967) were the first to show that a macro-
economic model becomes dynamic once it incorporates the government budget
, constraint c Like ours, their budget constraint failed to include the
payment of interest on government bonds. Such payment might seem a
detail but is more than that and was included in later work by Blinder
and Solow (1974) and Tumovsky (1977).
In chs . 6 through 8 we shall build a short-run and long-run fiscal-
policy models allowing for all this. But before we decide on the building
blocks of such models, let us see the years 1965-1980 as experienced in
six macroeconomic functions.
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FOOTNOTE
On the money-market side, monetarist tradition aggregates less
than we are doing and distinguishes among money, credit, and securities
markets. On the good-market side, monetarist tradition aggregates more
than we are doing and does not even distinguish between consumption and
investment demand [Brunner-Meltzer (1976)]. A good recent survey is
Svindland (1980).
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